Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives from Below by Banerjee, S. B.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Banerjee, S. B. ORCID: 0000-0002-8699-6368 (2021). Decolonizing Deliberative 
Democracy: Perspectives from Below. Journal of Business Ethics, doi: 10.1007/s10551-
021-04971-5 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/26915/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5
Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, 
University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights 
remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to.
Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, 
educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. 
Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a 
hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is 
not changed in any way. 
City Research Online
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5
ORIGINAL PAPER
Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives from Below
Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee1 
Received: 24 August 2020 / Accepted: 10 October 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
In this paper I provide a decolonial critique of received knowledge about deliberative democracy. Legacies of colonialism 
have generally been overlooked in theories of democracy. These omissions challenge several key assumptions of delibera-
tive democracy. I argue that deliberative democracy does not travel well outside Western sites and its key assumptions begin 
to unravel in the ‘developing’ regions of the world. The context for a decolonial critique of deliberative democracy is the 
ongoing violent conflicts over resource extraction in the former colonies of Africa, Asia and Latin America. I argue that 
deliberative democracy cannot take into account the needs of marginalized stakeholders who are defending their lands and 
livelihoods. The paper contributes to the literature by (1) offering a critique of hegemonic models of democracy that cannot 
address issues of inequality and colonial difference and (2) offering possibilities to imagine counterhegemonic alternatives 
for a democratization of democracy from below.
Keywords Deliberative democracy · Decoloniality · Indigenous struggles · Postcolonialism · Corporate social 
responsibility
‘The notion of One-World 
World signals the predominant 
idea in the West that we all live 
within a single world, made up 
of one underlying reality (one 
nature) and many cultures. This 
imperialistic notion supposes 
the West’s ability to arrogate 
for itself the right to be “the 
world” and to subject all other 
worlds to its rules, to diminish 
them to secondary status or to 
nonexistence, often figuratively 
and materially. It is a very 
seductive notion.
Arturo Escobar
The master’s tool will never 
dismantle the master’s house.
Audre Lorde
Most contemporary Western scholarship on business-society 
relationships tends to either ignore colonialism or relegates it 
to the margins. As an epistemic critique of knowledge about 
management postcolonialism calls attention to the absences 
of voices from the global South in the production of manage-
ment knowledge (Alcadipani et al., 2012; Srinivas, 2020). 
Critical management scholars have used insights from post-
colonialism to investigate neo-colonial power structures in 
a variety of contexts (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008; Jack et al., 
2011; Prasad, 2003; Westwood, 2006; Westwood & Jack, 
2007). Research has investigated the absence of colonial 
histories in representations of culture in international busi-
ness, textbooks (Fougère & Moulettes, 2012); images and 
representations of ‘African’ leadership in organization stud-
ies (Nkomo, 2011); hybridity in intercultural encounters 
(Dar, 2014; Frenkel, 2008; Yousfi, 2013); the hegemony of 
Western epistemology in international management research 
(Faria et al., 2010; Özkazanç-Pan, 2008); colonial complic-
ities in business school education (Boussebaa, 2020; Dar 
et al., 2020); race and racism in the elite postcolonial world 
of high finance (Prasad & Qureshi, 2016); identity regulation 
practices (Boussebaa et al., 2014); neo-colonial influences in 
processes of globalization and internationalization (Banerjee 
& Linstead, 2001; Boussebaa et al., 2012); and managerial 
subject formation in a colonial workplace (Srinivas, 2013).
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In the settler colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
South Africa and the United States colonial legacies con-
tinue to structure relations between Indigenous communities 
and multinational corporations. Latin American manage-
ment scholars have used insights from decolonial thinking to 
analyze Indigenous struggles against extractive development 
projects (Misoczky, 2011; Ehrnström‐Fuentes, 2016), chal-
lenge the epistemic coloniality of North American strategy 
scholarship (Wanderley & Faria, 2012), as well as provide 
Latin American perspectives on international management 
(Faria et al., 2010) and critical management studies (Mandi-
ola, 2010). Postcolonial critiques of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) policies and stakeholder engagement practices 
in particular have shown how colonial relations dominate 
deliberative processes of consultation between Indigenous 
communities and multinational corporations in the extractive 
industries (Banerjee, 2000, 2008) and in CSR interventions 
into Third World child labor (Khan et al., 2010). CSR is 
portrayed as an extension of deliberative democracy where 
consensus is reached with multiple stakeholders through a 
deliberative process (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). However, 
in its quest for consensus, deliberative processes elide lega-
cies of colonialism and structural inequalities that persist 
in contemporary societies. Ongoing conflicts over natural 
resource extraction in postcolonial states represent a failure 
of deliberative democracy and reflect patterns of internal 
colonialism that reinforce colonial modes of extraction.1 
Conflicts involving the fossil fuel industry in particular are 
issues of global importance because they have significant 
implications for climate change.
This paper is motivated by two research questions: In 
what ways does colonialism continue to cast its shadow in 
this postcolonial era by masking and subverting emancipa-
tory ideas of democracy? How could a decolonized democ-
racy allow us to imagine a more just and equitable society? 
This paper’s main contributions are to offer a critique of 
deliberative democracy from a decolonial perspective and 
suggest possibilities to imagine counterhegemonic alterna-
tives for a democratization of democracy from below. My 
aim is to provide new insights from a decolonial perspec-
tive that can change the conversation about deliberative 
democracy.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin with a critical 
analysis of the core concepts of deliberative democracy and 
describe some of is contradictory outcomes for the postco-
lonial world. Second, I trace the colonial past of democracy 
ideals and highlight its presence in contemporary neocolo-
nial institutions and structures. Liberal notions of democ-
racy arising from the Enlightenment era were underpinned 
by capitalist ideals and a colonial rationality that privileged 
and universalized Western notions of property. For exam-
ple, individual property rights were legitimized while del-
egitimizing communal land usage, which was the norm for 
Indigenous populations, who were portrayed as ‘premodern’ 
and ‘primitive’ by Enlightenment thinkers (Dhawan, 2014). 
Third, inspired by Latin American scholars and activists, 
I describe the decolonial project as an attempt to envision 
alternate perspectives that can ‘displace Western rationality 
as the only framework and possibility of existence, analysis 
and thought’ (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018, p. 17). Fourth, using 
the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests as an illustra-
tion, I show how contemporary organizational practices, in 
particular processes of land acquisition by multinational cor-
porations in the extractive industries enabled by state power, 
continue to be informed by colonial and racial hierarchies 
despite their claims of promoting deliberative democracy. 
I conclude by discussing the implications of a decolonial 
critique of deliberative democracy for business ethics and 
outlining future research directions that can explore alternate 
social and political imaginaries.
The Contents and Discontents 
of Deliberative Democracy
The year 2019 will be remembered as the year of protest 
with millions of people taking to the streets in Africa, Asia, 
the Americas and Europe to express their frustration with 
their political leaders. We appear to be in the middle of a 
democratic recession: approval ratings for most politicians 
and political parties across the world are abysmal, there are 
deep divisions in most Western democracies, and public 
trust in democratic institutions are at record lows (Fishkin 
& Mansbridge, 2017). The democratic boom following the 
wave of political decolonization in the 1950s and the end of 
the Cold War appears to be well and truly over with the rise 
of authoritarianism, social unrest, state repression of dissent, 
increasing human rights violations, government crackdown 
on free speech, violent conflicts over natural resource extrac-
tion and an increase in modern slavery, all of which are hap-
pening in ‘democratic’ countries (Amnesty International, 
2019). Democracy, or at least the model of dominant party 
system representative democracy in Europe and the United 
States appears to be under threat.
The recognition that in modern liberal Western democ-
racies formal democracy through majority rule precluded 
genuine participation of citizens led to a ‘deliberative turn’ 
in democratic theory in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
deliberative turn, pioneered by the philosophies of Habermas 
1 There are more than 3000 ongoing conflicts involving the extractive 
industries (mining, gas and oil) and communities impacted by extrac-
tive activity. Almost all of these conflicts involve Indigenous com-
munities in the postcolonial countries of Africa and Asia and in the 
settler colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States and 
Latin America (EJOLT, 2020).
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and Rawls and further elaborated by political theorists 
like Cohen, Dryzek, Fishkin, Gutmann, Mansbridge, and 
Thompson among others, began as a normative project that 
focused on deliberation as an ideal rational discourse where 
consensus was reached freely and without coercion. Political 
legitimacy was thus established through deliberative pro-
cesses that reflected the discursive quality of decision mak-
ing rather than representation through voting. Rationality of 
a democracy according to Habermas (1975, p. 32) was less 
about majority rule, which could not represent the interests 
of all citizens, but should be based on the ‘genuine participa-
tion of citizens in political will formation.’ Thus, more par-
ticipatory forms of democracy required a deliberative ideal 
involving a discursive process where citizens could freely 
communicate as equals to arrive at a rational consensus on 
decisions affecting their lives.
Merely acknowledging differences and inequalities does 
not make them disappear. Rather than seek an authoritarian 
consensus, a truly deliberative framework would need to 
accommodate conflict and dissent as well. Mouffe (1999) 
argues that a preoccupation with procedural issues relat-
ing to consensus depoliticizes the public sphere and that a 
robust and vibrant public sphere needs to embrace conflict 
and dissent. A more radical and progressive democratic 
politics would transform antagonism into ‘agonistic plu-
ralism’ where political contestations reflect not ‘antago-
nism between enemies but agonism between adversaries’ 
(Mouffe, 1999, p. 754). The aim is to ‘domesticate’ destruc-
tive antagonism into a constructive agonism where dem-
ocratic decisions may or may not be fully consensual but 
can also respectfully accept unresolvable disagreements’ 
(Hillier, 2003, p. 42). Or as Foucault (1984, p. 379) puts it 
‘one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against 
nonconsensuality.’
Deliberative democrats have acknowledged these cri-
tiques and attempted to broaden the scope of deliberative 
democracy to accommodate exclusions and inequalities. 
For instance, consensus—the desired outcome of delibera-
tion—was seen as not always desirable even when possible 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2018). Habermas’s later work 
also adopted a more flexible approach, acknowledging that 
‘in the case of controversial existential questions arising 
from different worldviews even the most rationally con-
ducted discursive engagement will not lead to consensus’ 
(Habermas, 2001, p. 43). The task then of a successful 
deliberative politics is to institutionalize appropriate pro-
cedures that can enable rational discourse among informed 
publics. This ‘public sphere’ is the institutionalized discur-
sive space where ordinary citizens could deliberate about 
politics, the economy, and other issues that affected their 
lives. Habermas’s notion of a public sphere was based on a 
historical analysis of the emergence of new forms of public 
interaction that took place in coffee houses, salons, and 
public squares during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. However, feminist and postcolonial scholars have 
critiqued Habermas’s notion of public sphere as being 
exclusionary and lacking in open access, participation 
and social equality that are key to democratic deliberation. 
If the public sphere was the space where consensus was 
being manufactured it becomes a new site of hegemonic 
domination (Fraser, 1990). The merchants and intellectu-
als who deliberated in cafes and salons about the weighty 
political and social issues of their time would in all prob-
ability have not appreciated the fact that the coffee they 
consumed was produced by slave labor in the colonies 
(Eze, 1997). Moreover, as Fraser (1990) points out, opin-
ion forming in the public sphere does not translate into 
actual decision-making in the political sphere, and even if 
such an extension were possible it would entrench existing 
hegemonies and reinforce existing structural inequalities 
and exclusions.
While ideal conditions of deliberative discourse may exist 
and enable rational consensus among wealthy residents of 
suburban Frankfurt or Princeton deliberating about the 
installation of additional streetlights in their neighborhood, 
it is difficult to imagine how Indigenous communities in the 
Brazilian Amazon can engage in deliberative discourse as 
equal citizens with powerful market and state actors intent 
on expanding mining and logging on Indigenous lands. Even 
in urban contexts it would be naïve to expect that citizens 
can participate as equals, respectfully, and exercise their 
reason freely given the realities of structural inequalities 
and discriminations based on race, class, gender and sexual 
orientation.
Another significant shortcoming in deliberative theories 
is its lack of a sophisticated analysis of power, which seems 
to be treated almost like an exogenous variable. The lib-
eral quest for legitimacy seemingly elides notions of power 
and authority because a key assumption of the deliberative 
ideal is the absence of coercive power. Legitimacy of a 
consensus produced by communicative rationality can also 
be hegemonic because one cannot assume that legitimacy 
always exists without domination (Clegg, & Haugaard, 
2009; Mouffe, 1999). Some scholars argue that delibera-
tive democracy has a ‘nuanced view of power’ because it 
acknowledges that coercive power can exist in deliberative 
practice (Curato et al., 2017, p. 31). However, they claim it 
is possible to limit coercive power through good ‘procedural 
design’ involving selection of ‘less partisan’ participants, 
using independent facilitators or making deliberations pub-
lic. Such an approach to power is patently unsatisfactory 
because it elides relationships between power, legitimacy 
and authority. How does ‘procedural design’ handle dissent 
or conflict? And if there is no dissent or conflict in delibera-
tions then has there been an elite capture of the process by 
excluding or marginalizing dissenting stakeholders?
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Deliberative democrats also assume that power, and 
sometimes coercion, is needed in a deliberative process, 
especially when implementing decisions contested by cer-
tain groups even if the deliberative process was fair and rea-
soned (Curato et al., 2017). So the assumption is that the 
state, the only ‘legitimate’ source of coercive power, can 
and should use coercion to implement decisions arrived at 
in deliberative forums. As we shall see later when we discuss 
conflicts over natural resources, this is clearly an untenable 
argument because it legitimizes the use of state violence to 
implement decisions made in deliberative forums character-
ized by vastly structurally unequal conditions that disem-
power marginalized populations. Debates about deliberative 
democracy elide power dynamics in the broader political 
economy in which deliberative processes are embedded 
(Dryzek, 2016). In cases where there are significant power 
asymmetries and where actions can have serious economic, 
social and environmental impacts on communities as is the 
case with extractive industries, procedural design, however 
carefully designed, cannot accommodate divergent and 
sometimes incommensurable views on land use. Rather 
institutional, material, and discursive power that constitute 
the global political economy determine governance struc-
tures and processes of natural resource extraction. These 
forms of power somehow remain ‘outside’ of deliberative 
discourse but create particular forms of legitimacy that deny 
pluralism of values and rationalities thus marginalizing the 
legitimate struggles of populations whose values do not con-
form to the ‘norm’ (Banerjee, 2018, p. 804).
To summarize: despite its shortcomings there appears 
to be consensus among scholars in the field that a delib-
erative process can ‘help revive democratic legitimacy, 
provide for more authentic public will formation, provide 
a middle ground between widely mistrusted elites and the 
angry voices of populism, and help fulfill some of our com-
mon normative expectations about democracy’ (Fishkin & 
Mansbridge, 2017, p. 6). But is this optimism unfounded? 
What are the silences and erasures in deliberative democ-
racy? Are there limits to ‘authentic public will formation’ 
and ‘democratic legitimacy’ that marginalize segments of 
the citizenry? These are some questions I explore in the next 
section.
Postcolonial and Decolonial Deliberations
What is remarkable about the various debates in delibera-
tive democracy is the silence about Western colonialism, 
especially in Habermas’s universalizing notion of com-
municative rationality. Similar silences can be seen in the 
work of some Enlightenment thinkers whose concession 
(and complicity) to slavery and colonialism is paradoxical 
and puzzling given their proclamations of universal freedom 
(Dhawan, 2014; Eze, 1997). Enlightenment reasoning and 
philosophies of history provided an intellectual justification 
of more than two hundred years of colonialism. There was 
little awareness that the much-celebrated use of reason also 
creates new forms of domination, even more insidious than 
coercive power because these forms of domination are justi-
fied by reason itself (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972). Liberal 
ideas of freedom, progress, development, and democracy 
are deeply embedded in the idea of Empire, whose mission 
involved political subjugation of those it sought to empower 
and civilize without a critical reflexivity of the impact of 
European colonialism on European philosophy (Banerjee & 
Arjaliès, 2021). Even the Frankfurt School, despite its influ-
ential work on domination in modern society and critiques 
of the Enlightenment, is as Said (1993, p. 278) points out 
‘stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resist-
ance, and oppositional practice in the empire’.
It is important we engage with these critiques to arrive 
at a more nuanced understanding of the complex histori-
cal relationships between colonialism and democracy and 
more importantly identify what traces continue to exist in 
contemporary political thought. As Fabian (2002, p. 33) 
points out, good or bad intentions do not alone invalidate 
knowledge: for that to happen ‘it takes bad epistemology 
which advances cognitive interests without regard for its 
ideological presuppositions.’ And certainly one could argue 
there is an epistemological closure in EuroAmerican repre-
sentations of democracy that does not recognize attempts by 
postcolonial countries to create their own forms of govern-
ance consistent with their own conceptions of freedom and 
rights because they may not conform to ‘ideal’ standards 
(Koelble & Lipuma, 2008). If Enlightenment inspired ideas 
of democracy elides historical facts about slavery and colo-
nialism then it becomes imperative to reimagine democracy 
while maintaining the Enlightenment’s spirit of critique, or 
as Marx puts it ‘the weapon of the criticism cannot replace 
criticism of the weapon.’
Settler Colonialism and the (Post)colonial State
Colonialism was constitutive of European notions of sover-
eignty, international law and development (Anghie, 2005). 
International law was deployed to legitimize and facilitate 
colonial processes and territorial expansion. Discourses 
of ‘civilization’ and ‘development’ for example, created 
and sustained the binary categories of civilized-barbaric 
and developed-underdeveloped where sovereignty always 
remained on the side of the ‘civilized’ and ‘developed’ 
(Banerjee, 2008). Once sovereignty was established along 
the dimensions of civilization and development, in the post-
colonial era the key ‘universal’ problem was how to cre-
ate order among newly sovereign states (Anghie, 2005, p. 
4). As Hussain (2003) argues, the historical formation of 
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colonialism reveals the self-generative epistemic space of 
the West in its ability to create the rule and the exception, 
which allowed it to apply sovereignty unequally to newly 
independent countries. In essence, Third World sovereignty 
was ‘manufactured by the colonial world to serve its own 
interests’ (Anghie, 2005, p. 215).
While colonialism and settler colonialism are related 
there are important structural differences—the distinction 
between the colony and metropolitan center is emphasized 
in colonialism whereas settler colonialism attempts to erase 
this difference by obscuring the fact that settlement was also 
invasion (Veracini, 2011, 2013). In the Anglophone settler 
colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa 
and the United States the ‘settler revolution’ (Belich, 2009) 
involved the genocide of Indigenous peoples and the repop-
ulation of those regions by European peoples. The term 
‘settler’ belies the violence of settlement and the dispos-
session of Indigenous peoples. Europeans who arrived in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became ‘settlers’ 
with permanent land rights displacing (and eliminating) 
Indigenous peoples who had lived on those lands for many 
thousands of years. Settler colonialism ‘destroys to replace’ 
and can be defined as ‘an inclusive, land-centered project 
that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from 
the metropolitan center to the frontier encampment, with a 
view to eliminating Indigenous societies’ (Wolfe, 2006, p. 
393). The elimination doctrine of settler colonialism was 
based on race, as was the early immigration policies of the 
settler colonies, such as the White Australia policy, which 
was dismantled in stages only after the end of the Second 
World War. Land appropriation was also justified as being 
part of the civilizing mission designed to eliminate Indig-
enous societies, through assimilation, legal domination, and 
even genocide (Bell, 2016). Among the Aztec, Mayan and 
Inca societies alone more than 65 million people were exter-
minated in less than 50 years (Quijano, 2007).
Anglophone settlers were also part of the imperial eco-
nomic network of goods and resources, which further con-
solidated their material power. The success of the Anglo-
phone colonial project was also the inspiration for Nazi 
Germany’s plans to remove populations in Eastern Europe 
to provide land for German ‘Aryan’ farmers—the ‘last great 
land grab in the long and bloody history of European colo-
nialism’ (Tooze, 2006, p. 462). The ‘German Hunger Plan’ 
involving forced starvation mirrored policy directives of US 
government and military forces against Native Americans. 
Settler colonialism involved the creation of ‘neo-Europes’ 
(Crosby, 1986) where the occupation of lands distant from 
Europe was enabled not just by the arrival of Europeans 
but also disease spreading microbes, weeds, domesticated 
plants and animals that accompanied them. European set-
tlers, immune from the new diseases that decimated Indig-
enous populations, were not just ‘silent allies’ but an integral 
part of the colonial weaponizing of diseases like smallpox 
(Fenn, 2000).
Colonial relations between Indigenous populations and 
settler states are ongoing and unfinished unlike in postcolo-
nial countries that gained independence from their former 
colonial rulers (Chen & Mason, 2019). If the postcolonial 
moment for the former colonies was independence from for-
eign rule, for Indigenous peoples in the settler colonies the 
result was coercive assimilation and the search for ever elu-
sive rights in a ‘postcolonial’ nation state. Settler colonial-
ism ‘was a structure, not an event’ in the sense that invasion 
did not stop after the first moment of occupation but con-
tinued through waves of migration with the accompanying 
imposition of European political, economic and institutional 
structures on dispossessed Indigenous populations (Wolfe, 
2006, p. 397).
The colonial state was the opposite model of the modern 
European state because colonial subjects were denied citi-
zenship rights at a time when European citizens were being 
bestowed with social, political and economic rights—as 
Chakrabarty (2000, p. 4) argues, the ‘European colonizer 
of the nineteenth century both preached Enlightenment 
humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it 
in practice.’ Postcolonial scholars argue that Enlightenment 
ideals of reason, modernity, science and progress were uni-
versalized through colonialism and violence. ‘Universal’ 
reason privileged Western knowledge systems while del-
egitimizing local knowledge systems in the colonies: the 
‘rest’ of the world, because it ‘lacked’ reason could only be 
constituted as objects of Western knowledge, a process of 
epistemic violence that devalued and disqualified knowledge 
possessed by the colonial subject. If the world is knowable 
only through European categories then certain hierarchies 
are created through this process of knowing, which as we 
will see later have always been resisted by the objects of 
that knowledge. Asymmetrical power/knowledge relations 
establish and sustain a position of flexible positional supe-
riority that privileges Western scholarship in relation to the 
Other (Said, 1993). This fixing of difference operates from 
a privileged position that creates dichotomies of advanced/
backward, developed/undeveloped, modern/primitive that 
need to be ‘managed’ by the advanced, developed and mod-
ern (Banerjee & Arjaliès, 2021).
Racial hierarchies also inscribed the logic of colonial-
ism which operated on a system of racial exclusion based 
on Enlightenment influenced normative criteria that guar-
anteed political equality to whites while denying the same 
to nonwhites, the effects of which can still be felt today by 
Indigenous populations in the settler colonies of the Ameri-
cas, Australia and New Zealand. Racial hierarchies, empire, 
territorial expansion, resource extraction and looting that 
were the hallmarks of colonialism in the eighteenth century 
evolved into more hegemonic forms of domination through 
 S. B. Banerjee 
1 3
discourses of modernization, development and neoliberal 
globalization which in effect marked ‘the continuation of 
Western imperialism by informal means and through insti-
tutions of global governance’ (Tully, 2008). Apart from the 
brutal violence it carried out for more than two centuries 
colonialism also profoundly transformed social, political 
and economic relations among governed populations. Divide 
and rule polices also fragmented Indigenous populations in 
the Africa, the Americas and Asia thus making the task of 
managing dissent easier. It should come as no surprise that 
political elites in postcolonial countries found it beneficial to 
reproduce colonial modes of governance for both economic 
and political gain as well as to manage dissenting popula-
tions (Koelble & Lipuma, 2008; Stanley, 2019).
However, postcolonial theory fails to explain contem-
porary forms of dispossession and violence in postcolonial 
successors of colonial states in Africa and Asia. Indigenous 
communities in these newly independent states found them-
selves under new forms of postcolonial domination espe-
cially in their struggles against natural resource extraction 
from their lands. Extractive modes of development largely 
remained largely intact, even intensified as former colonies 
found themselves locked into the development discourse of 
global neoliberal capitalism. The market-state nexus is a key 
hegemonic formation in the postcolonial era that created the 
conditions which enable corporations to extract surplus from 
resource rich but cash poor communities. In India for exam-
ple, which has a population of more than 70 million Indig-
enous people mainly living in resource rich areas, national 
polices for economic growth have resulted in processes of 
‘internal colonization’ (Shrivastava & Kothari, 2012) and 
calls for ‘sacrifice zones’ in the name of national progress 
(Temper & Martinez-Alier, 2013). These ‘land wars’ are 
currently taking place in 130 of India’s 602 districts with 
208 reported conflicts involving Indigenous communities 
and the state (EJOLT, 2020). Forms of internal colonial-
ism in both postcolonial and settler colonies involve the 
biopolitical control of populations through prisons, ghettos, 
policing, state violence, surveillance and criminalization of 
dissent (Preston, 2013; Tuck & Yang, 2012).
The postcolonial era appears to have become an era of 
more efficient colonialism where colonialism has learnt to 
manage things better by using native elites to take on the role 
of former colonial administrators. Postcolonialism’s preoc-
cupation with culture, past ideological hegemony, regimes of 
representation, and critiques of European histories however 
valid, diverted attention from the material conditions of the 
political economy and the structural inequalities of capital-
ist relationships (Dirlik, 1994). For subaltern populations 
struggling against contemporary structures of oppression, 
sophisticated postcolonial concepts of ‘hybridity’, ‘mim-
icry’ and ‘ambivalence’ offered little in the way of resist-
ance strategies.
Colonial legacies and the continuing production of ine-
qualities among Indigenous populations in the settler colo-
nies cannot be understood in the grammar of the postcolonial 
canons that explain colonial histories of Asia and Africa. 
Describing the Brazilian president Javier Bolsonaro, the 
Indigenous feminist and human rights activist Rigoberta 
Menchú Tum K'iche', the cricket captain of Australia (Tim 
Paine), or the CEOs of Google (Sundar Pichai) and Micro-
soft (Satya Nadella) as ‘postcolonial’ may be technically 
correct but theoretically meaningless (not to mention politi-
cally irresponsible). The canons of postcolonialism have, 
with few exceptions, produced knowledge about the sub-
altern by following the same colonialist epistemology that 
it critiqued, instead of knowledge produced with and from 
a subaltern perspective (Dirlik, 1994; Grosfoguel, 2013). 
Reconfiguring earlier forms of domination in the language 
of postcolonialism does not offer radical emancipatory pos-
sibilities of creating alternate economic, social and political 
imaginaries. Emerging scholarship on decoloniality offers 
some insights on decolonizing both postcolonial studies and 
democracy as we will see in the next section.
Towards a Decolonial Imaginary
Scholarship on decoloniality offers a critical perspective 
where subaltern difference becomes the basis for decolo-
nizing deliberative democracy involving a critical engage-
ment with knowledges and cultural practices that were 
delegitimized by colonialism (Faria et al., 2010). Decolo-
niality recognizes the failure of the postcolonial state to 
live up to the promise of decolonization and ‘interrogates 
the postcolonial nation state as a colonizing entity in the 
context of struggles over Indigenous sovereignty’ (Baner-
jee, 2021, p.4). Emerging from Latin America, decolonial 
scholarship followed a different but related trajectory than 
postcolonial studies, which was dominated by the work of 
diasporic South Asian scholars trained in the English liter-
ary canons and whose inaccessible writing had little to offer 
to non-English speaking scholars (Misoczky, 2019). Settler 
colonialism in the Americas, as we have discussed earlier, 
differed in significant ways from the predominantly Brit-
ish colonialism in India, the Middle East and Africa, which 
was the focus of postcolonial studies (Harding, 2017). The 
fundamental critique of European colonialism by decolonial 
scholars was similar to what was articulated earlier by post-
colonial scholars: the fixing of difference based on a privi-
leged Eurocentric position, racial hierarchies, and the binary 
categorizations of primitive/modern, developed/underdevel-
oped, and civilized/barbaric. However, there is a temporal 
difference: while postcolonial scholarship refers mainly to 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries decoloniality begins 
from the moment of European invasion of the Americas in 
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the fifteenth century (Bhambra, 2014). Postcolonial scholar-
ship’s obsession with culture and the fetishization of differ-
ence also diverted criticism of capitalism and its associated 
inequalities and forms of oppression, which are central to 
decolonial thinking (Dirlik, 1994).
Latin American scholars like Aníbal Quijano, María 
Lugones, Gloria Anzaldúa, Maldonado-Torres and Walter 
Mignolo among others pioneered scholarship with a deco-
lonial epistemic perspective that takes into account diverse 
worldviews, particularly of subaltern racial and ethnic 
populations from the Global South, to produce alternate 
epistemologies that transcend the Western canon. Colonial 
difference becomes the basis of the production of these sub-
altern knowledges resulting in a decolonized epistemology 
from the perspective of marginalized populations (Mignolo, 
2000). The notion of coloniality is inextricably linked with 
modernity—coloniality is constitutive of modernity and 
hence ‘there is no modernity without coloniality and no 
coloniality without modernity’ (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018, 
p. 4). This critical ‘border thinking’ (Anzaldúa, 1987) is the 
decolonial response to Habermas’s Eurocentric ‘unfinished 
project of modernity’ from the perspective of the oppressed 
and exploited side of the colonial difference (Grosfoguel, 
2013, p. 26).
Quijano’s (2000, 2007) concept of the coloniality of 
power, which constitutes the global capitalist system in lib-
eral democracies, is central to decolonial thought. Coloni-
ality of power reflects forms of domination that continued 
in democratic postcolonial countries after the end of direct 
colonialism, reinforcing historical structural inequalities of 
the colonial era (Ballestrin, 2015). Coloniality of power is 
based on a Eurocentric racialized classification of societies 
that was imposed on Latin America after European invasion: 
the modernity that was designed to break the shackles of the 
primitive past of postcolonial countries also embedded them 
in racial and ethnic hierarchies that constitute the interna-
tional division of labor (Grosfoguel, 2007; Quijano, 2007). 
Feminist philosophers have extended decolonial scholarship 
by drawing attention to the coloniality of gender, which was 
neglected in initial formulations of decoloniality (Harding, 
2017; Lugones, 2010; Manning, 2018). Decolonial feminism 
requires overturning the coloniality of gender by a critical 
analysis of the racialized and capitalist forms of gender 
oppression (Lugones, 2010).
Knowledge production has generally been a one way 
street where theories that are produced in the ‘global North’ 
are imposed on the ‘global South’ (Alcadipani et al., 2012). 
Producers of theories, including democratic theories, have 
generally ignored postcolonial critiques and subaltern theo-
ries. This epistemic coloniality inflects theories of democ-
racy in two ways requiring new modes of understanding: 
first, there is a need to understand how coloniality in democ-
racy produces inequality and injustice, conditions that will 
always hinder the democratic project. Second, democracy 
in coloniality requires an understanding of how democracy 
is used to sustain coloniality (Ballestrin, 2015). This is the 
essence of the decolonial project. Such a perspective can 
provide deeper insights into understanding why and how 
democracies in postcolonial countries ‘deviate’ from the 
norm while also understanding how the norm itself is con-
stituted by colonial relations of power. Western powers, to 
protect their own interests, have exported democracy to non-
European sites through soft power using international aid, 
trade deals, human rights regimes and cultural exchange pro-
grams, backed up by military power when these forms of 
persuasion fail or as Ballestrin (2015, p. 221) puts it, ‘when 
the platforms of democracy and human rights serve to justify 
contemporary imperial expansion, coloniality is imposed.’
Decoloniality is also rooted in praxis whereas much of 
postcolonial scholarship is preoccupied with the cultural 
domain. The starting point for a decolonial praxis is to imag-
ine radically different perspectives that can dislodge Western 
rationality as the only basis of reality (Mignolo & Walsh, 
2018). This does not mean an outright rejection of West-
ern notions of progress, democracy and development but 
involves a critical reflexivity that can ‘liberate the produc-
tion of knowledge, reflection, and communication from the 
pitfalls of European rationality/modernity’ (Quijano, 2007, 
p. 177). Rather than lapse into fundamentalist thinking, a 
critique of Eurocentric modernity is a project of transmo-
dernity (Dussel, 2012), which involves imagining multiple 
worlds and forms of democratic alterity as opposed to the 
global imposition of a single modernity and liberal form of 
democracy centered in Europe (Grosfoguel, 2013). Trans-
modern forms of democracy entails decolonizing the racial 
and capitalist bases of liberal democracy. This epistemologi-
cal decolonization is a difficult task involving new forms of 
intercultural understanding that could form the basis of alter-
nate rationalities. Merely bringing in non-Western perspec-
tives into the canon is not sufficient—for example describing 
an African ‘ubuntu’ ethics in a European academic journal 
may qualify as an alternative moral theory but it still fails 
as a decolonization project because this knowledge is inter-
pellated in Western rules of validation of knowledge and a 
coloniality of power (Naude, 2019). Perhaps understanding 
decolonial sites of dissent, resistance, and protest and the 
multitude of livelihood struggles arising from a politics of 
difference may enable us to imagine other worlds that are not 
defined by Eurocentric modernity (Escobar, 2004). Many of 
these struggles are about a praxis of living and communal 
organizing that is delinked from the modern capitalist nation 
state (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018).
Decoloniality is not the same as political decolonization 
that occurred during the 1800s in Latin America and the mid 
twentieth century in Africa and Asia when former colonies 
gained independence and became new nation states. The 
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transition from colonialism to nationalism while marking 
a postcolonial moment for the nation state excluded large 
segments of its populations who were now governed by the 
same rationality and coloniality of knowledge that inscribed 
the colonial project. Recognition of ethnic minorities among 
postcolonial nations does not challenge existing power rela-
tions or the dominant state model of development. For 
instance, while the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples guaranteed their economic, cultural 
and religious rights and the right to strengthen their social 
and political institutions, it not clear how Indigenous peoples 
can actually exercise these rights, because as Article 46 of 
the Declaration states: ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or per-
son any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed 
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dis-
member or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States’.
However, a decolonial imaginary requires delinking from 
the ‘political unity of sovereign and independent states’ 
because it is this unity that fixes colonial difference within 
global power structures, disallowing other modes of exist-
ence. Any alternative framework must take into account 
‘the epistemic force of local histories and to think theory 
through the political praxis of subaltern groups, where the 
Other becomes the original source of an ethical discourse’ 
(Escobar, 2004, p. 217). In rejecting the universalizing 
and totalizing claims of Western modernity, a decolonial 
imaginary does not privilege the nation state as a site for 
struggle because coloniality ensures that the state cannot 
be decolonized or democratized (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018). 
Instead, the decolonial project is a search for multiple local 
and regional forms of governance that avoids the pitfalls 
of undemocratic and repressive regimes which characterize 
contemporary liberal democracies.
Scholarship on Indigenous sovereignty in Australia, the 
Americas and New Zealand has challenged dominant nar-
ratives about the founding of these nation states and docu-
mented how a false political authority was claimed through 
land that was ‘acquired’ forcibly or fraudulently and by 
unilateral extinguishment of native title (Hendrix, 2010). 
The triumphalist narratives of settler colonial states never 
pose the key question: ‘Where does the force of one law to 
extinguish the laws of the other draw its legitimacy from’? 
(Watson, 2006, p. 29). This denial of the original violence 
of state sovereignty and colonial histories along with an 
affirmation of Indigenous cultures becomes the basis of 
Indigenous claims to sovereignty and self-determination 
(Volmert, 2010). Whether in settler colonies or post-colo-
nial countries, Indigenous groups with distinct preferences 
and cultures remain marginalized minorities despite being 
bestowed with ‘citizen rights.’ Rather than participate in 
public will formation Indigenous peoples have the will of 
non-Indigenous citizens imposed on them and only a shift in 
political authority can change their current situation. While 
some advocates of deliberative democracy may be ‘greatly 
skeptical about the chances of survival’ of Indigenous com-
munities (Benhabib, 2002, p. 185) their ongoing struggles to 
protect their lands indicate that resistance is fertile (Baner-
jee et al., 2021). These communities have been fighting to 
preserve their way of life since the colonial era began and 
their struggles continue in the postcolonial era. Colonial 
sovereignties of the modern nation state supersede Indig-
enous sovereignty and where there is conflict and dissent in 
deliberative procedures of public will formation the (post)
colonial state exercises coercive power to impose the will of 
‘the people’, as I discuss in the next section.
‘Our History is the Future’2: Indigenous 
Struggles as Contested Sovereignties
Indigenous3 communities all over the world bear the brunt 
of state and market violence. In the postcolonial countries 
of Asia and Africa, independence from colonial rule meant 
little to these communities except that their struggles were 
now against their own (mostly) democratically elected gov-
ernments rather than their former colonial rulers. In the set-
tler colonies of the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand, 
Indigenous peoples who had survived genocide, forms of 
apartheid, and assimilation became interpellated into the 
modern democratic nation state as second class citizens in 
their own land. Democratic citizenship for these populations 
was a violent process because the allegedly emancipatory 
notions of progress, development, rights, and reason that 
characterized liberal democracies were profoundly incom-
mensurable with Indigenous worldviews about relationships 
to land and nature.
In 2007 the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
after decades of activism by Indigenous organizations. In 
the preamble the declaration affirms that member states are 
‘concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from his-
toric injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and 
2 ‘Our History is the Future’ is the title of a book by Nick Estes that 
provides a firsthand account of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) 
protests.
3 While there are different definitions of what constitutes an Indig-
enous person I adopt the view proposed by Sanders (1999, p. 11) who 
defined Indigenous peoples as ‘those ethnic groups that were indig-
enous to a territory prior to being incorporated into a national state, 
and who are politically and culturally separate from the majority eth-
nic identity of the state that they are a part of.’ Indigenous peoples 
constitute 5% of the world’s population but account for 15% of the 
‘extreme poor’ according to the World Bank.
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dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus 
preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to 
development in accordance with their own needs and inter-
ests’ (United Nations, 2007). Article 32 of the Declaration 
called for consultation ‘in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institu-
tions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior 
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territo-
ries and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water 
or other resources.’ In the extractives industries the concept 
of a ‘social licence to operate’ through consultation with 
multiple stakeholders is often used as an indicator of com-
munity acceptance of extractive projects. However, attempts 
by companies to obtain a social licence to operate run the 
risks of co-opting dissenting stakeholders while structural 
power imbalances ensure that conflicting worldviews remain 
marginalized (Ehrnström-Fuentes & Kröger, 2017). Fissures 
in democratic governance can be seen in ongoing conflicts 
over resource extraction between Indigenous communities, 
states and multinational corporations. Between 2002 and 
2017, 1,558 people in 50 countries were killed for protecting 
their lands, forests, water and other natural resources (Butt 
et al., 2019). About 40% of those killed belonged to Indig-
enous tribes in Central America, South America and Asia 
who continue to face devastating social, cultural, economic, 
and environmental impacts arising from resource extraction.
While 144 countries have ratified the declaration, Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States initially 
voted against the declaration. Their main reservation was 
about the ‘right to self-determination’ and the defini-
tion of ‘Indigenous peoples.’ Since then all four countries 
have endorsed the declaration with some caveats—Canada 
described the declaration as ‘aspirational,’ Australia empha-
sized that the declaration was not ‘legally binding,’ while the 
United States clarified its position on the declaration’s ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ by stating ‘the United States 
recognizes the significance of the Declaration’s provisions 
on free, prior and informed consent, which the United States 
understands to call for a process of meaningful consulta-
tion with tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of 
those leaders, before the actions addressed in those consulta-
tions are taken’ (US Department of State, 2010; emphasis 
mine). Colonial state power is clearly evident here: what 
does ‘meaningful consultation’ mean when resource extrac-
tion projects can still proceed without ‘agreement of tribal 
leaders?’.
The inextricable and contradictory link between sov-
ereignty and colonialism can be seen in the disavowal of 
Indigenous sovereignty and land rights in Australia and 
other settler colonies. In the landmark Mabo case when 
in 1992 the Australian High Court for the first time rec-
ognized Aboriginal native title overturning the doctrine of 
terra nullius (or ‘land belonging to no one’), the acquisition 
of Australia was deemed to be an ‘act of state’ and Indig-
enous sovereignty was declared ‘non-justicable’ (Behrendt, 
2003). As Brady (2007, p. 149) points out, for Indigenous 
peoples in settler-colonial states Western notions of sover-
eignty represent ‘power, imperialism and the unrelenting 
exercise of colonialism’ where citizenship was coercive and 
involved forced assimilation into the white settler normative 
framework. Native title in Australia was recognized by the 
colonial state precisely because it gave itself the power to 
extinguish it in order to serve interests of mining companies 
(Banerjee, 2000).
Indigenous views of land as a bundle of relationships 
stand in stark contrast with the market/state view of land 
as a bundle of property rights. The structural features of 
settler colonialism transformed land to property and human 
relationships to land to ownership, a process that involved 
‘profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence’ 
(Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 5). This violence was also deeply 
racialized: Indigenous people and slaves in the United States 
were racialized in different ways but with the same goal of 
ensuring the dominance of white settlers as legitimate occu-
piers of the land. Classifying African slaves as ‘black’ or 
‘colored’ had material consequences because their repro-
duction increased the wealth of slave owners. In contrast, 
it served the colonial project to racially classify Indigenous 
people as ‘savages’ and ‘less than human’ because it justified 
the logic of eliminating them and confiscating their lands.4 
Whether in settler colonies or postcolonial nation states the 
reality of Indigenous life was a duality between an inter-
nal sovereignty constituted by cultural norms that governed 
Indigenous communities and an external sovereignty of an 
independent nation state with far greater power and authority 
and whose values and beliefs were incommensurable with 
Indigenous cosmologies (Brady, 2007).
The sovereignty of the neoliberal state always prevails 
over the sacredness and cultural value of land regardless 
of the types of internal sovereignty or self-governance that 
may exist in Indigenous communities. Cultural and spiritual 
4 Racial hierarchies pervade Enlightenment philosophy. In his early 
work, Kant asserted that ‘Native Americans are the lowest of the 
four races as they are completely inert, impassive and incapable of 
being educated.’ He placed the ‘Negroes’ above them as ‘they are 
capable of being trained to be slaves but are incapable of any other 
form of education.’ For Kant, ‘the white race possesses all motivating 
forces and talents in itself.’ and ‘Native Americans and Negroes can-
not govern themselves (they) serve only as slaves’ (Kant, 1775/1950; 
1776/1978). Similarly Hegel imperiously dismissed all of sub-Saha-
ran Africa because of what he deemed were ‘deficiencies of the Afri-
can spirit’, describing Africa as ‘this land of children, of barbarity 
and wildness where no real history can take place. There is no goal, 
no state there, that one could observe, no subjectivity, but only a 
series of subjects who destroy each other’ (Hegel, 1837/1916).
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values of Indigenous peoples are routinely nullified with 
state power and regulation. For example, in the lawsuit 
against ExxonMobil following the oil spill from the tanker 
Exxon Valdez a court ruled (based on ‘anthropological evi-
dence’ provided by an Exxon-hired anthropologist) that the 
‘subsistence culture’ of the Alutiq people of southern Alaska 
had not been damaged by the oil spill because ‘culture is 
deeply embedded in the mind and heart.’ Consequently there 
was no loss of cultural resources resulting from the environ-
mental disaster and hence no monetary compensation was 
required (Temper and Martinez-Alier, 2013). So yet again in 
liberal democracies colonial power becomes the epistemic 
basis of a privileged Eurocentric position that can explain 
culture and define the realities and identities of marginal-
ized populations, while eliding power asymmetries inher-
ent in the fixing of colonial difference. These asymmetries 
were thrown into stark relief in the protests by Indigenous 
communities and their supporters over the construction 
of the Dakota Access Pipeline in the United States during 
2016–2017, as we will see in the next section.
Market‑State Colonial Violence and The Dakota 
Access Pipeline Protests
The resistance movement against the Dakota Access Pipe-
line (DAPL) by the Standing Rock Sioux tribal nation is an 
example of how internal colonialism operates in contem-
porary liberal democracies. The $3.78 billion 1,172 mile 
long pipeline cuts through South Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois 
to be linked to existing pipelines designed to transport up 
to 570,000 barrels a day of crude oil. The pipeline passes 
near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota 
whose tribal leaders claim that it would disturb sacred sites, 
violate past treaties and Indigenous sovereignty and pose 
grave dangers to the tribe’s water supply in the event of an 
oil spill.5 After years of ‘deliberations’ where the recurring 
objections of tribal representatives were ignored followed 
by unsuccessful lawsuits, tribal protestors decided on direct 
action and set up camp at the site to block construction. The 
resistance movement caught the national and international 
imagination with thousands of supporters joining in includ-
ing environmentalists, climate change activists, Indigenous 
land rights activists, lawyers, war veterans and Indigenous 
tribes from other countries. For the first time in more than 
250 years all seven bands of the Sioux nation came together 
to conduct ceremonies to protect their land and water.
Little has changed for Indigenous communities in North 
America and elsewhere in terms of the colonial relations of 
power that structure their encounters with the state. Treaties 
offered little protection to Indigenous lands which for cen-
turies had been taken by force by colonial law enforcement 
agencies to serve government and private interests. Treaties 
did not explicitly recognize political sovereignty of Indig-
enous ‘nations’ but was a strategy used by the U.S. govern-
ment to carry out ‘land cessions’ and justify acquisition of 
lands that could not be taken by force. This process required 
an enforceable system of individual property rights, a cor-
nerstone of liberal democracies, where ‘settlers’ could hold 
private property in perpetuity whereas Indigenous ‘occu-
pancy’ was seen as temporary, whose collective ownership 
could be extinguished for private ownership but not the other 
way around (Estes, 2019, p. 108).
The long and violent history of colonialism in North 
America continues to play out today in conflicts over land, 
water and mineral rights. A major cause of contemporary 
conflicts is a failure of governance, especially in the res-
ervation system and tribal councils ostensibly designed to 
give tribes some level of self-governance and autonomy. The 
breakdown of traditional governance arrangements and the 
imposition of an electoral system in tribal councils destroyed 
kinship networks that were fundamental to tribal decision-
making and governance, creating bitter rivalries between 
families and communities over access to state and market 
resources (Estes, 2019). The distinction between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ spheres, sacrosanct in liberal democracies, is 
less obvious among Indigenous communities where indi-
vidual interests are sometimes inseparable from community 
interests (Koelble & Lipuma, 2008). Similar neocolonial 
governance structures were imposed in other settler colo-
nies of Australia, Canada and New Zealand ensuring that 
Indigenous land and water rights were accorded based on 
the needs of settlers.
The DAPL protest was not just a fight about water rights 
but a livelihood struggle to protect a way of life that colo-
nialism had nearly destroyed. The protests were violently 
quelled by militarized police and private security forces 
with armored vehicles, rubber bullets, mace, water cannons, 
attack dogs, tear gas, concussion grenades, armed drones 
and helicopters. The North Dakota governor declared a state 
of emergency and called in the National Guard to clear the 
encampment of peaceful protestors. It is difficult not to see 
the racialized nature of state violence in quelling tribal pro-
tests—these tactics are rarely, if at all used to suppress pro-
tests by white American citizens. Tribal leaders also pointed 
to the racial injustice of the project—an earlier proposal to 
route the pipeline through Bismarck, a town whose popula-
tion is 92% white, was rejected because of risks to the town’s 
water supply.
The DAPL case, like most cases of conflict over land and 
natural resources involving Indigenous communities reveals 
the fundamental shortcomings of deliberative democracy in 
5 Fears over oil spills were not unfounded: In 2017 and 2019 an esti-
mated 590,000 gallons of oil spilled from a leak in the pipeline into 
agricultural lands and wetlands (Winsor, 2019).
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its elision of power relations and colonial histories. Advo-
cates of deliberative democracy argue that when the ‘demo-
cratic process is marked by contentious disagreement, lack 
of mutual respect, systematic exclusion of disadvantaged 
individuals and blatant disregard for relevant facts and 
values, the need for deliberation is greatest’ (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2018, p. 902). These conditions certainly apply 
to the DAPL case but because theories of deliberative 
democracy cannot meaningfully account for power asym-
metries arising from colonial relations, no amount of ‘ago-
nistic deliberation’ (Brand et al., 2020, p. 3) can overcome a 
‘market centered stakeholder engagement’ (Dawkins, 2015, 
p. 2) that is the norm in deliberations over land use and 
natural resource extraction. The ‘deliberations’ conducted 
before the decision was made to reroute the pipeline through 
Indian land (without their consent) typified the ‘consulta-
tions’ that take place between Indigenous communities and 
market/state actors: Indigenous representatives are allowed 
a seat at the table but their voices are either not heard or 
deliberately silenced (Dalrymple, 2016).
In the case of the DAPL protests, violence against the 
protestors was deployed through a collusion between market 
and state actors: the owners of the pipeline, Energy Trans-
fer Partners hired the private security firm TigerSwan to 
conduct surveillance of activists and to provide daily ‘intel-
ligence updates’ to federal and state law enforcement agen-
cies (Estes, 2019). When the state and big business collude 
to become legitimate providers of violence in a democ-
racy then that democracy, deliberative or otherwise, must 
be questioned. Non-deliberative forms of communication 
like songs and storytelling (both an integral part of Indig-
enous protests at DAPL), the collective power of social 
movements, and moral compromise, celebrated by so many 
deliberate democrats, did not have any material effects but 
instead the protests were violently supressed by state and 
market power making a mockery of the ‘unforced force of 
the better argument’ (Habermas, 1998, p. 306). Rather, one 
could reasonably ask as Flyvbjerg (1998, p. 80) does, ‘why 
use the force of the better argument when force alone will 
suffice’ especially when the force is the state acting as the 
armed enforcement for corporate interests? In the so-called 
postcolonial era, the justice and police systems in liberal 
democracies of settler colonies are built on colonial ideals 
and beliefs that are ultimately meant to serve and protect one 
segment of society at the expense of another.
Ceremonial elders at the protest camps recalled stories of 
historical violence and massacres of Native Americans in 
the area—Wounded Knee and Whitestone where more than 
300 women and children were killed by the US military. The 
‘Indian’ wars in North America have never ended and Stand-
ing Rock is the continuation of a long history of oppression 
and violence against Native Americans, an ongoing fight 
for Indigenous sovereignty over their lands against colonial 
rule. And this war is also being fought by Indigenous com-
munities in the other settler colonies of Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand who are resisting resource extraction pro-
jects on their lands and fighting for their sovereignty. Dis-
possession of Indigenous lands is enabled by a disregard 
for Indigenous land rights and either a lack of consultation 
with Indigenous peoples or culturally inappropriate and 
ultimately coercive forms of deliberative consultative pro-
cesses. In the context of the Indigenous political economy 
decolonization is not just about equity or social justice or a 
fight against oppression—it is also about the repatriation of 
Indigenous land and making ‘decolonization accountable to 
Indigenous sovereignty and futurity’ (Tuck & Yang, 2012, 
p. 35).
Thus, for many Indigenous communities the issue is 
not deliberate democracy but Indigenous sovereignty and 
self-determination, concepts that sit uneasily with liberal 
democracies. Even enthusiasts of deliberative democracy 
like Benhabib and Dryzek appear to acknowledge some 
level of incommensurability in deliberating positions when 
it comes to Indigenous struggles: short of advocating full 
Indigenous sovereignty these scholars call for forms of self-
determination or ‘conditional’ forms of sovereignty (Dryzek, 
2005, p. 239) where communities can ‘negotiate and debate 
the future of their own conditions of existence’ (Benhabib, 
2002, p. 185). Others call for a more radical break from the 
rights of the state and to create new forms of Indigenous 
sovereignty based on ownership, authority and self-deter-
mination (Forni, 2010). In the concluding section I discuss 
the implications of decolonial thinking for business ethics.
Implications for a Decolonial Business Ethics
What are the implications of a decolonial critique of delib-
erative democracy for business ethics? If as Burg (2009, p. 
675) claims the ‘objective of a deliberative business ethic is 
to develop and maintain a normative environment that sup-
ports the social and economic functions of commerce’ then 
it is imperative to understand how the coloniality of power 
constructs particular normative environments. In particu-
lar, efforts to democratize deliberative democracy require 
paying attention to colonial relations of power between dif-
ferent groups rather than seek ways to expand and refine 
deliberative procedures in different geopolitical contexts. 
If, as we have seen, deliberative democracy cannot accom-
modate incommensurable positions then understanding the 
basis of incommensurability as articulated by ‘historically 
subalternized identities’ can provide insights on how democ-
racy can be decolonized from its Western liberal formations 
(Ballestrin, 2015, p. 217). Such understanding requires an 
epistemic diversity that will allow us to investigate how dif-
ferent populations conceptualize and experience democracy, 
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freedom, rights, development, prosperity and ecology by lis-
tening to the demands of voices ‘from below’, for example, 
movements like Buen Vivir which emerged from Indigenous 
struggles against development projects in Latin America 
and which reflect Indigenous ontologies that require ‘the 
subordination of economic objectives to ecological criteria, 
human dignity, and social justice’ (Escobar, 2015, p. 455). 
Acknowledging epistemic diversity has to be accompanied 
by an ontological diversity because Indigenous worldviews 
are based on a relational ontology where humans and nonhu-
mans co-constitute the world, which is profoundly different 
from Western realist ontologies based on a human-nature 
dichotomy (Banerjee & Arjaliès, 2021). Relational ontolo-
gies that underlie Indigenous philosophies of human-nature 
relationships are also sources of resistance against extractive 
projects that reflect a ‘politics of place’ and place related 
identities of Indigenous communities (Ehrnström-Fuentes, 
2019). Here place becomes more than land and territory 
which are redefined based on the histories of reciprocal 
relationships between humans, animals, forests, and waters 
(Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2020). Human-nature relationships are 
non-hierarchical in a relational ontology and when nature 
becomes relational and not an entity the dichotomy between 
humans and nature collapses giving rise to different different 
realities and meanings of progress and development.
A decolonial perspective also reveals the limits of delib-
eration at the organizational level. Deliberative democracy 
has been operationalized at the organizational level through 
discourses of political corporate social responsibility 
(PCSR) (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), which seems to have 
as many advocates as critics (Dawkins, 2019; Mehrpouya 
& Willmott, 2018). The normative basis of PCSR reflects 
Habermasian notions of deliberation in its assumption that 
deliberative processes of corporate engagement with state 
and civil society actors are desirable because they create a 
more democratic public sphere. If democracy at the hands 
of the state has largely failed marginalized populations in 
the so-called Global South than the perils of handing over 
democracy to corporations are even more severe. Critics 
have pointed out that PCSR gives corporations defacto 
political authority without increasing business accountabil-
ity (Hussain & Moriarty, 2018; Willke & Willke, 2008), 
undermines democratic legitimacy, (Sabadoz & Singer, 
2017); does not challenge instrumental CSR (Mäkinen & 
Kourula, 2012), overemphasizes the effects of globalization 
(Whelan, 2012) while neglecting the role of the state (Frynas 
& Stephens, 2015), and fails to account for structural and 
discursive power (Banerjee, 2018). In response Scherer et al. 
(2016) proposed a rebooted version of PCSR 2.0, which 
while acknowledging some criticisms still failed to provide 
a sophisticated analysis of power relations that determine 
the ‘political’, resulting in a sanitized depoliticized notion 
of politics as ‘public deliberations, collective decisions and 
the provision of public goods’ (Scherer et al., 2016, p. 276). 
PCSR, being derivate of deliberative democracy suffers from 
the same shortcomings of a communicative process that 
relies more on procedural design rather than on the power 
of actors. Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), like the For-
est Stewardship Council and Fairtrade coffee, much lauded 
by PCSR advocates, are less open processes of deliberative 
democracy but more a series of hegemonic accommodation 
to dominant interests (Fougère & Solitander, 2020; Levy 
et al., 2016; Moog et al., 2015). At best PCSR is myopic and 
self-serving, at worst it can be a ‘predatory corporate pro-
ject’ (Rhodes & Fleming, 2020, p. 945) when it is deployed 
as a weapon to obscure colonial processes of dispossession 
and violence while providing legitimacy to corporate actors 
(Alamgir & Banerjee, 2019; Özkazanç-Pan, 2019; Varman 
& Al-Amoudi, 2016).
Decolonial perspectives on deliberation and political CSR 
can reveal the contested legitimacies that are at the root of 
conflicts between MNCs and marginalized communities 
(Ehrnström‐Fuentes, 2016; Ibarra-Colado, 2006). Decolo-
nizing PCSR, if that is at all possible, means an engagement 
with histories of corporate engagement with Indigenous 
communities. Recent studies however show how continuing 
colonial narratives inform corporate engagement with Indig-
enous communities. Analyzing the Hudson’s Bay Compa-
ny’s historical engagement with its Indigenous stakeholders, 
Van Lent and Smith (2020) found that the company’s CSR 
efforts were mainly directed at enhancing its legitimacy by 
denying claims of ‘cultural genocide’ in Canada’s Truth and 
Reconciliation report and appropriating Indigenous culture 
for heritage branding. Similarly, PCSR ‘partnerships’ with 
Indigenous communities for resource extraction projects in 
Canada ‘obscure and normalize processes of environmen-
tal racism, oppression and violence’ (Preston, 2013, p. 43). 
More research is needed to understand the colonial assump-
tions underlying PCSR strategies, especially for marginal-
ized populations in deeply divided societies. Under what 
conditions does organizational deliberation produce negative 
consequences for its stakeholders? How does deliberative 
PCSR manage dissent and conflict in its quest for consensus?
A decolonial perspective also requires retheorizing the 
role of the state in deliberative business ethics. In an era of 
global neoliberal capitalism the postcolonial nation state is a 
fundamental building of globalization through its integration 
in complex global supply chains, facilitating access to multi-
national corporations, instituting business friendly labor and 
environmental policies, and expanding extractivism (Ehrn-
ström-Fuentes & Kröger, 2018; Ong, 2000). In recent years 
the state in many postcolonial countries has come to resem-
ble more a police state than a democratic state in deploy-
ing state violence to suppress dissent among communities 
protesting resource extractive projects on their lands (Baner-
jee, 2008). How should multinational corporations (MNCs) 
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respond to state violence directed at communities that are 
stakeholders in their business? How can MNCs respond to 
increased demands for political autonomy from disaffected 
populations? What would a ‘power-sharing state with attenu-
ated sovereignty’ (Dryzek, 2005, p. 218) look like and how 
should multinational corporations negotiate with states and 
communities when expanding their business operations?
Decolonial perspectives on deliberative democracy have 
implications for emerging research on governance in areas of 
limited statehood in countries where state capacity to govern 
effectively is compromised by a variety of historical, politi-
cal and economic factors. In areas of limited statehood gov-
ernments do not have the capacity and ability to implement 
and enforce rules of governance or deliver public goods and 
services in certain parts of their territory, and sometimes 
even lack their ‘legitimate’ monopoly over the means of vio-
lence due to the active presence of militant groups (Risse, 
2011). Deliberate democrats would be nonplussed and more 
than a little troubled if one described a postcolonial version 
of a Habermasian public sphere (regions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq readily come to mind) comprising militant groups, reli-
gious leaders, village elders and merchants deliberating in 
a local coffee shop about the daily violence under US mili-
tary occupation, the installation of puppet governments, the 
lack of basic services and the granting of land to Western 
mining companies for mineral exploration and extraction. 
A public sphere where militant groups designated as terror-
ist organizations by the West are seen by local populations 
as being more legitimate and representative than govern-
ments because they deliver public goods and services that 
the state is unable or unwilling to provide. Governance in 
areas of limited statehood involve a range of international 
and national non-state actors (including MNCs) operating 
at multiple levels of rule and authority structures in their 
interactions with local actors. Whether these deliberative 
forms of governance lead to inclusive institutional and/or 
state building is debatable and more research is needed to 
understand how deliberative democracy operates in areas of 
limited statehood (Arda & Banerjee, 2019).
Finally, there is a need for more research to understand 
the possibilities and limits of developing decolonial forms 
of deliberation based on Indigenous struggles. Decolonial 
perspectives on deliberative democracy can contribute to 
emerging scholarship on translocal governance by offer-
ing insights into democratization processes ‘from below’ 
that are more participatory than representative or delibera-
tive forms of democracy because social relations are based 
on Indigenous notions of reciprocity and exchange rather 
than competition (Banerjee, 2018). Translocal governance 
reflects more horizontal relations between local communi-
ties instead of the vertical modes of governance that char-
acterize relationships between a nation state and its citizens. 
These spaces offer possibilities of modes of existence not 
solely determined by market-state governance arrangements 
and can also create new sources of agency and translocal 
solidarities for communities. Horizontal alliances between 
communities can strengthen the legitimacy of local concerns 
thereby giving communities a stronger voice rather than a 
tokenistic presence in deliberations, including the right to 
say no to development and a refusal to participate in delib-
erative forums that are structurally unequal. The normative 
goal of translocal governance is not consensus, which as 
we have seen tends to disempower marginalized commu-
nities, but coexistence, self-determination and autonomy. 
Its legitimacy stems from Indigenous ecology—notions of 
community, territory, nature and culture embedded in Indig-
enous epistemologies and ontologies—with representative 
community councils as the structure of authority to make 
decisions that affect the community (Ballestrin, 2015). For 
instance, locally derived organizational forms such as gram 
sabhas in India or los caracoloes in Latin America are more 
representative of community concerns and reflect decolonial 
social relations. More research is needed to investigate how 
these organizations negotiate decisions with state and non-
state institutions. However, it is also important not to auto-
matically privilege locally derived organizations but rather 
to demonstrate the same reflexivity used to problematize 
deliberative democracy in order to investigate if relations of 
domination in terms of class, caste, race, gender or sexual 
orientation exist in these organizational structures.
If democracy that is ‘already here’ cannot represent all 
its citizens equally and absolutely then its lack of closure 
implies there is a democracy ‘always to come’ (Derrida, 
2005, p. 152). Democracy, according to Derrida is governed 
by an autoimmune logic, which works to preserve in itself 
the thing that both defines it and can destroy it: sovereignty. 
Democracy coopts sovereignty to immunize and protect 
itself from destruction but it can only do so by exercising 
a sovereignty that excludes, denies difference and homog-
enizes the multiplicity that is the basis of the formation of 
democracy in the first place, omissions ‘that always return to 
haunt the supposed sovereignty of any political community, 
destroying the community’s immunity from difference and 
otherness’ (Matthews, 2013). One cannot imagine democ-
racy without sovereignty, which when deployed to protect 
democracy ends up destroying it, but somewhat paradoxi-
cally this autoimmune flaw opens up new possibilities of a 
‘democracy to come’. The ‘to come’ does not just imply a 
temporality of the future but also ‘possibilities for interven-
tion, disruption, transformation and resistance that opens 
radically different horizons for democracy that is always to 
come….a democracy without end’ (Matthews, 2013).
What would deliberate democracy look like from the 
perspective of groups who have been marginalized by an 
elite capture of discourses of development? If development 
in the postcolony requires ‘sacrifice zones’ in the name of 
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national progress (Temper & Martinez-Alier, 2013) then it 
becomes a matter of principle that those who are going to 
be sacrificed make that decision themselves (Zinn, 1980). 
This principle calls for ‘epistemic disobedience’ through a 
process of decolonizing knowledge with the aim of build-
ing just and democratic societies (Mignolo, 2009, p. 1). 
Decolonizing democracy can take place through articu-
lations between the local and the global where the goal 
is less about creating an inclusive democracy but more 
a ‘peaceful (or conflictive) coexistence in a given field 
of different models and practices of democracy’ (Santos, 
2005, p. lxix). Deliberative democracy, despite efforts 
to be inclusive remains hegemonic and reflects a failure 
of the imagination because it normalizes difference and 
facilitates assimilation of dissenting groups within the 
dominant ideology. True difference can only be embod-
ied by imagining a pluriverse, defined with such powerful 
clarity by the Zapatistas as a ‘world where many worlds 
can coexist.’
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